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Ten minste vier stellingen met betrekking tot het onderwerp van het proefschrift 
 
1. The postwar American conception of the transatlantic relationship as an evolving Atlantic 
‘community’ was one by-product of the bipartisan foreign policy synthesis of the early 
Cold War as it preserved the consensus between, on the one hand, the liberal view of this 
relationship as a scaled-down world community and, on the other hand, the conservative 
predisposition to construct this relationship around the long-established strategic 
partnership and kinship with Great Britain. 
 
2. How Americans judged Gaullism largely depended on whether they were liberal or 
conservative; as the liberal mindset was dominant during much of de Gaulle’s presidency, 
the Franco-American disagreement must therefore be partially understood as a clash 
between an American foreign policy steeped in liberal values and a French foreign policy 
steeped in the conservative European tradition. 
 
3. The negative response to Gaullism in the United States, in particular among liberals, was 
an offshoot of the anti-Europeanism and the Europhobia that has influenced American 
foreign policy from the founding days of the Republic. 
 
4. The moderate response of U.S. presidents to de Gaulle’s ‘heresy’ within the transatlantic 
alliance from 1958 to 1969 illustrates the accommodating nature of American hegemony 
in Western Europe and underlined how little leverage the U.S. ultimately had to compel a 
wayward ally to follow its lead. 
 
5. De Gaulle’s policy of independence within the Western alliance imposed limits on 
American power by creating strategic and political realities different from those that had 
been envisioned in Washington, even as the achievement of many of de Gaulle’s aims 
depended on continued American involvement in Europe. 
 
6. De Gaulle’s foreign policy contributed to a paradigm shift in American perceptions of the 
transatlantic relationship from the notion of an evolving Atlantic ‘community’ toward a 
more realistic Atlanticism primarily attuned to the national interest. 
 
7. President Eisenhower’s search for a compromise in response to de Gaulle’s ‘tripartite’ 
memorandum proposal of September 1958 preoccupied him more than is often 
understood; he was prepared to furnish any assistance to the French nuclear program not 
prohibited by the Congress as well as to extend the ‘special’ relationship with Great 
Britain to France by creating an informal consultation mechanism in London. 
 
8. De Gaulle’s political maneuvering was chiefly responsible for President Johnson’s 
decision in late 1964 to let the American proposal for a NATO sea-based multilateral 
nuclear force (MLF) wither on the vine. 
 
9. By the spring of 1964, the Johnson administration began to prepare politically and 
militarily for a French withdrawal from NATO, which was finally announced by de 
Gaulle in February 1966. 
 
 2
10. The partial reassessment among historians of Lyndon Johnson as a competent foreign 
policy president is supported by the judicious restraint with which he handled the French 
challenge to the United States within the Western alliance, as this restraint brought 
important political and psychological compensations, reduced the symbolic appeal of de 
Gaulle’s policy of independence, and facilitated the beginnings of Franco-American 
accommodation in 1968. 
 
11. President Nixon and his National Security Adviser Henry Kissinger sympathized with de 
Gaulle’s political philosophy to such a degree that they represented an American version 
of Gaullism, thereby raising the probability that the Franco-American relationship would 
have been significantly less antagonistic had Nixon been elected president in 1960. 
 
Vier stellingen met betrekking tot het vakgebied van het onderwerp van het proefschrift 
 
12. The history of American foreign policy from the early days of the Republic can be 
explained in terms of the interplay between the two mainstream traditions in American 
politics: liberalism and conservatism. 
 
13. Dean Acheson’s foreign policy outlook was an amalgamation of the conservative and 
liberal internationalist traditions in American foreign policy, and therefore cannot simply 
be typecast as realist. 
 
14. American neoconservatism is one particular synthesis of liberalism and conservatism in 
response to the rapid emergence and the relative decline of the United States as a global 
power in the twentieth century. 
 
15. The coming into being of the French nuclear force contributed to Franco-German 
political reconciliation by removing remaining French insecurities about a resurgent 
German military threat, as is reflected in de Gaulle’s answer to Henry Kissinger’s question 
how he proposed to prevent Germany from dominating Europe: “Par la guerre.” 
 
Ten hoogste vier stellingen over onderwerpen naar keuze 
 
16. NATO may not have been indispensable in order to protect Western Europe in the Cold 
War, which enabled de Gaulle to withdraw France from NATO in 1966, yet it became 
indispensable for safeguarding European security after the Cold War, which helps to 
explain France’s partial rapprochement toward NATO from the 1990s. 
 
17. The goal of completing one’s doctoral dissertation must be considered inferior to that of 
maintaining one’s family, so one should be careful not to prioritize the former over the 
latter. 
 
18. Het regeerakkoord van het kabinet Balkenende-IV bewijst dat de komma onvoldoende 
wordt begrepen door de opstellers van dit akkoord, waardoor het kabinetsstandpunt over 
een parlementair ‘instemmingsrecht’ bij besluiten tot de inzet van Nederlandse militairen 
in het buitenland onnodig lang onduidelijk bleef. 
